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[3] 
Should the Power of  
Presidential Pardon be Revised? 
by BUDD N. SHENKIN AND DAVID I. LEVINE 
Introduction 
Although the Administration of President Donald J. Trump has not 
succeeded in provoking much awe, it has certainly provided more than its 
share of shock, including the way it has brandished the power of the 
presidential pardon.1  President Trump has tested the limits of the power by 
hinting that he can pardon himself.2  He violated the standard Department of 
Justice procedures of screening pardon candidates by taking nakedly 
 
   Budd N. Shenkin, M.D., M.A.P.A. Member, Board of Advisors, University of California, 
Goldman School of Public Policy.  David I. Levine, J.D. Raymond Sullivan Professor of Law, 
University of California, Hastings College of the Law.  
 1.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (“[H]e shall have power to grant reprieves and pardons for 
offenses against the United States, except in cases of impeachment.”).  The U.S. Supreme Court 
has held that, except for the express exclusion for impeachment, the President’s power to pardon 
federal offenses is “unlimited.”  Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333, 380 (1866).  It is not subject to 
congressional control.  Id.  The context of Garland is discussed in JEFFREY P. CROUCH, THE 
PRESIDENTIAL PARDON POWER 41-42 (2009).  Crouch also discusses and distinguishes the forms 
of clemency the President may invoke: full and conditional pardons, commutation, remit fines and 
forfeitures, reprieve, and amnesty.  Id. at 20. 
 2.  Carol D. Leonnig et al., Trump Team Seeks to Control, Block Mueller’s Russia 
Investigation, WASH. POST (July 21, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ politics/trumps-
lawyers-seek-to-undercut-muellers-russia-investigation/2017/07/20/232ebf2c-6d71-11e7-b9e2-20 
56e768a7e5_story.html (reporting that President Trump asked his advisers about his power to 
pardon himself among others).  The position of the U.S. Justice Department’s Office of Legal 
Counsel is that the President may not pardon himself, but that proposition has never been tested.  
Mary C. Lawton, Presidential or Legislative Pardon of the President: Memorandum Opinion for 
the Deputy Attorney General, SUPPLEMENTAL OPINIONS OF THE OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL (Aug. 
5, 1974), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/opinions/1974/08/31/op-olc-supp-v001-p0 
370_0.pdf.  See JEFFREY P. CROUCH, supra note 1, at 70-71 (addressing the self-pardon 
controversy); see also BRIAN C. KALT, CONSTITUTIONAL CLIFFHANGERS: A LEGAL GUIDE FOR 
PRESIDENTS AND THEIR ENEMIES 39-60 (2012).  
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political steps to pardon Arizona Sheriff Joseph “Joe” Arpaio,3 who was 
convicted for felony contempt of court for failing to cease mistreatment of 
prisoners of color, and right-wing provocateur Dinesh D’Souza, who pled 
guilty to campaign finance violations.4  President Trump pardoned Conrad 
Black, a longtime friend and business partner, who was deported after 
serving a sentence for fraud, embezzlement, and obstruction of justice, but 
who had written a glowing book about Trump.5  In 2019, he flirted with 
pardoning war criminals on Memorial Day.6  He apparently offered to pardon 
aides and other federal employees who might break the law while fulfilling 
his quest to build a wall across the entire border with Mexico.7  Even more 
significantly, Trump has played a cagey game of self-protection by offering 
 
 3.  DONALD J. TRUMP, EXECUTIVE GRANT OF CLEMENCY FOR JOSEPH M. ARPAIO, (Aug. 
25, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/pardon/file/993586/download.  See Julie Hirschfield Davis & 
Maggie Haberman, Trump Pardons Joe Arpaio, Who Became Face of Crackdown on Illegal 
Immigration, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 25, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/25/us/politics/joe-
arpaio-trump-pardon-sheriff-arizona.html; Tyler Brown, The CourtCan’t Even Handle Me Right 
Now: The Arpaio Pardon and Its Effect on the Scope of Presidential Pardons, 46 PEPP. L. REV.331 
(2019). 
 4.  DONALD J. TRUMP, EXECUTIVE GRANT OF CLEMENCY FOR DINESH D’SOUZA, (May 31, 
2018), https://www.justice.gov/pardon/page/file/1067776/download.  See Editorial, Dinesh D’Souza? 
Really?, N.Y. TIMES (May 31, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/31/opinion/dinesh-dsou 
za-trump-pardons.html. 
 5.  Donald J. Trump, Executive Grant of Clemency for Conrad Moffat Black (May 15, 2019) 
https://www.justice.gov/pardon/page/file/1163776/download.  See Colby Itkowitz, Trump Pardons 
Billionaire Friend Conrad Black, Who Wrote a Book About Him, WASH. POST (May 15, 2019), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-pardons-billionaire-friend-conrad-black-who-wr 
ote-book-about-him/2019/05/15/b494b208-7771-11e9-bd25-c989555e7766_story.html.  Black, 
Arpaio and D’Souza are members of a select group of just twenty-one people to whom Trump has 
granted clemency during his first thirty months in office.  U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, CLEMENCY 
STATISTICS OF DONALD J. TRUMP (Aug. 13, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/pardon/clemency-
statistics#DonaldJTrump. 
 6.  Editorial, The President and His Power to Pardon, N.Y. TIMES (May 19, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/19/opinion/trump-pardon-conrad-black-patrick-nolan.html.  
The Editorial Board of the New York Times deemed President Trump’s use of the pardon power “a 
new trend in presidential clemency: mercy for lawbreakers in the mold of disgraced politicians, 
media personalities and political allies who have flattered, defended or curried favor with the 
president.” 
 7.  Editorial, Trump has No Trouble Gutting the Law to Build His Wall, WASH. POST (Aug. 
29, 2019), https://beta.washingtonpost.com/opinions/trump-has-no-trouble-gutting-the-law-to-bui 
ld-his-wall/2019/08/29/86e9af22-c9d1-11e9-a1fe-ca46e8d573c0_story.html.  The Editorial Board 
of the Washington Post observed: “Mr. Trump has breezily suggested he would grant presidential 
pardons to those who run afoul of the law—a suggestion subsequently dismissed by a White House 
official, who assured The Post it was a joke. Hilarious.” 
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glimpses of pardons for witnesses who are “loyal” and not “rats” who 
cooperate with law enforcement.8 
In the wake of this presidency, there will doubtless be a raft of reform 
measures.  We believe that reform of the pardon power should be a top 
priority because this power goes to the very heart of a basic tenet of our 
government: everyone is equal before the law.  Since that power sits squarely 
in the Constitution, and not merely in statutory law or custom, reform 
requires a constitutional amendment.  Our specific proposal to provide a 
check on the pardon power is this: amend the United States Constitution to 
require that every presidential pardon have the co-signature of the Speaker 
of the House of Representatives to become effective. 
Constitutional amendments are notoriously challenging.  Nonetheless, 
as we discuss below, we believe that our proposed amendment has a good 
chance of passage, both because there is likely no strong constituency whose 
power would be compromised by this change, and because extreme 
circumstances might warrant this change.  Picture the situation, for instance, 
if President Trump should decide to pardon his convicted campaign chair, 
Paul Manafort, his indicted advisor, Roger Stone,9 his children, other 
associates, and even himself; we believe that the Country’s outrage would 
make anything possible. 
 
 8.  ROBERT S. MUELLER, III, REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION INTO RUSSIAN 
INTERFERENCE WITH THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION (Mar. 2019), https://games-cdn.w 
ashingtonpost.com/notes/prod/default/documents/f5fe536c-81bb-45be-86e5-a9fee9794664/note/a 
8d336ef-e98d-4a08-987d-b4c154b22700.pdf.  Special Counsel Robert Mueller’s report includes 
sections in Volume II regarding the President’s conduct towards Michael Flynn, Paul Manafort, 
Michael Cohen, and another person whose name is redacted.  For example, with respect to Paul 
Manafort, the Report states: “[T]he evidence supports the inference that the President [Trump] 
intended Manafort to believe that he could receive a pardon, which would make cooperating with 
the Government as a means of obtaining a lesser sentence unnecessary.”  Id. at 132-33.  With 
respect to Cohen, who told Mueller’s investigators that he recalled discussing the possibility of a 
pardon with the President’s personal counsel, the Report states: “[T]he evidence . . . could support 
an inference that the President used inducements in the form of positive messages in an effort to 
get Cohen not to cooperate, and then turned to attacks and intimidation to deter the provision of 
information or undermine Cohen’s credibility once Cohen began cooperating.”  Id. at 154.  For 
examples of contemporaneous press accounts of President Trump’s efforts to influence witnesses 
with the possibility of pardons, see, e.g., Michael S. Schmidt et al., Trump’s Lawyer Raised 
Prospect of Pardons for Flynn and Manafort, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 28, 2018), https://www.nytimes. 
com/2018/03/28/us/politics/trump-pardon-michael-flynn-paul-manafort-john-dowd.html; Julie 
Hirschfield Davis & Eileen Sullivan, Trump Praises Manafort, Saying, ‘Unlike Michael Cohen’ 
He ‘Refused to Break,’ N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 22, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/22/ 
us/politics/trump-cohen-manafort.html.  
 9. Andrew Blake, Donald Trump Will ‘Definitely’ Pardon Roger Stone: Mueller Witness 
Randy Credico, WASH. TIMES (Mar. 29, 2019) https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2019/ 
mar/29/donald-trump-will-definitely-pardon-roger-stone-mu/. 
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I.  Origin and Course of the Presidential Pardon 
Uses for the presidential pardon appear to have had two phases: one 
from the adoption of the Constitution in 1789 until the Watergate scandal, 
and the second from the Watergate scandal until now.10  During our country’s 
conception, the Founding Fathers adopted the pardon power from the 
English Prerogative of Kings, and placed it in Article II, Section 2 of the 
United States Constitution.11  Alexander Hamilton defended “the benign 
prerogative” in The Federalist Papers for its element of mercy in cases 
where the sometimes blunt instrument of the law may have perpetrated 
unduly harsh judgments.12  He also envisioned the presidential pardon 
serving as a potential tool for civic welfare, for instance, enabling the 
government to forgive participants in rebellions, and thus offering a means 
of easing the offenders’ reincorporation into civil society.13  Hamilton argued 
that the pardon power should continue to be vested in a single individual, 
hopefully one “of prudence and good sense,”14 rather than in a group.15  He 
wrote that, if it were up to the President alone, he would be more mindful of 
the case and his ability to aid someone in distress.16  When the Anti-
Federalists worried that the President might use the pardon to prevent 
investigation into his own associates or himself,17 Hamilton responded that 
a President of high character would be restrained from misuse of the 
power by the prospect of peer obloquy following a mischievous decision; 
 
 10. Margaret Colgate Love, The Twilight of the Pardon Power, 100 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 1169, 1211-12 (2010).  
 11. William Duker, The President’s Power to Pardon: A Constitutional History, 18 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 475 (1977).  See also Daniel T. Kobil, The Quality of Mercy Strained: Wresting the 
Pardoning Power from the King, 69 TEX. L. REV. 569, 590 (1991) (“By choosing to repose the 
clemency power in the chief executive alone, the Framers of the Constitution aligned themselves 
with a vision of the power that was decidedly British in nature.”). 
 12.  “Humanity and good policy conspire to dictate that, the benign prerogative of pardoning 
should be as little as possible fettered or embarrassed.”  THE FEDERALIST NO. 74 at 362 (Alexander 
Hamilton) (Terence Ball ed., 2003).  Hamilton also addresses the pardon power briefly in Federalist 
Paper 69.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 69 at 336-37 (Alexander Hamilton).  
 13.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 74, supra note 12, at 363. 
 14.  Id. 
 15.  Hamilton contended that since a group “might often encourage each other in an act of 
obduracy,” one person “appears to be a more eligible dispenser of mercy of the government than a 
body of men.”  Id.  
 16.  See Paul F. Eckstein & Mikaela Colby, Presidential Pardon Power: Are There Limits 
and, If Not, Should There Be?, 51 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 71, 79-80 (2019) (quoting Hamilton). 
 17.  See Saikrishna Prakash, The Chief Prosecutor, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 521, 596 (2005). 
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if that were not enough, he could be impeached.18  The view of Hamilton 
and other Federalists prevailed while the Constitution was being drafted; 
efforts to share the power with the Senate failed by a margin of 8-2 of the 
states voting.19 
In practice, the presidential pardon has typically been used for mercy, 
but it has also been used for civic welfare.  In 1795, George Washington used 
the pardon to expedite reconciliation after the quelling of the Whiskey 
Rebellion.20  During the Civil War, Abraham Lincoln used it to bolster the 
morale of Union troops by pardoning Union Army deserters and others from 
harsh sentences, including the death penalty.21  Lincoln, and later, Andrew 
Johnson, granted pardons and amnesty to many ex-Confederates in an effort 
to preserve and rebuild the Union.22 
The most notable misuse of the pardon came from the personally honest 
but loyal-to-his-friends Ulysses S. Grant, who pardoned several colleagues 
 
 18.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 69 at 336.  See also JEFFREY CROUCH, supra note 1, at 18 
(explaining Hamilton’s position that, “[d]espite the wide reach of the clemency power . . . the 
protections were adequate because the president would always be subject to impeachment if he 
acted improperly, even if he pardoned treasonous executive branch allies”); see also Jeffrey 
Crouch, Presidential Misuse of the Pardon Power, 38 PRES. STUD. Q. 722, 723 (2008); Mark Osler, 
Clemency as the Soul of the Constitution, 34 J.L. & POL’Y 131, 154 (2019) (James Madison also 
asserted that impeachment would be a possible remedy for abuse of the power to pardon).  Based 
on their days as feisty revolutionaries who had overthrown the King and Parliament, at least these 
Founders did not appreciate how difficult and exceptional impeachment would become in the 
decades to follow.  
 19.  Harold J. Krent, Conditioning the President’s Conditional Pardon Power, 89 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1665, 1673 (2001); Kobil, supra note 11, at 590-591.  This view was also adopted by Chief 
Justice John Marshall in the first U.S. Supreme Court case to consider the presidential pardon 
power.  Writing for the Court, Marshall said that, just like the British monarch, in issuing a pardon, 
the President bestowed “an act of grace. . . .  It is the private, though official, act of the executive 
magistrate.”  United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. 150, 160 (1833).  
 20.  Carrie Hagen, The First Presidential Pardon Pitted Alexander Hamilton Against George 
Washington, SMITHSONIAN.COM (Aug. 29, 2017), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/first-
presidential-pardon-pitted-hamilton-against-george-washington-180964659/. 
 21.  Love, supra note 10, at 1177-78.  Lincoln may have been too kind-hearted at times.  His 
own Attorney General believed that Lincoln was “‘unfit to be trusted with the pardoning power, 
partly because he was too susceptible to women’s tears.”  Id. at 1178.  “People joked that 
enterprising merchants in the District of Columbia rented weeping children and widow’s weeds to 
the mothers of condemned soldiers before their audiences with the President.”  Id. at 1178 n.33. 
 22.  JONATHAN T. DORRIS, PARDON AND AMNESTY UNDER LINCOLN AND JOHNSON: THE 
RESTORATION OF THE CONFEDERATES TO THEIR RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES, 1861-1898 at 8 (1953).  
Some of Johnson’s practices were subject to criticism.  Some people thought that Johnson, and 
perhaps his son, were susceptible to the entreaties of certain “pardon brokeresses” with 
“questionable characters.”  Id. at 146-151.  Johnson’s political foes in Congress, the Radical 
Republicans, considered whether he had abused his power to grant pardons or amnesty.  By the 
time the House of Representatives actually impeached Johnson in 1868, however, that alleged 
abuse was not expressly part of the articles of impeachment.  Id. at 329-332, 350-52.  
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involved in the “Whiskey Ring.”23  Other than Grant’s notorious weakness 
for his associates, there were few uses of pardons out of self–interest until 
the Watergate scandal in the 1970s,24 when a marked change seemed to 
occur.25  President Ford’s 1974 pardon preempted the legal prosecution of 
ex-President Nixon to prevent a return to what Ford had called “our long 
national nightmare.”26  While this pardon was merciful to Nixon personally, 
and arguably served the civic purpose Ford claimed for it by allowing the 
nation to move on, it also served the political end of protecting the 
Republican Party and its members from continued public disgrace and 
perhaps other discoveries of wrongdoing.  It had other, longer term 
repercussions as well.  This short-circuiting of the legal process contributed 
to an impression that the President is above the law.  Secondly, even though 
the pardon was widely unpopular and arguably led to Ford’s defeat in 1976, 
he emerged from the pardon without personal disgrace.  The signal to future 
Presidents may have been: do what you would like with political pardons 
because you can get away with them. 
The next great scandal of illegal acts by the executive branch was the 
Iran-Contra affair.  Although President Ronald Reagan resisted pressure to 
pardon the Iran-Contra conspirators,27 President George H. W. Bush 
exercised no such restraint.  Having been defeated for reelection, but having 
not yet departed office, he issued Christmas Eve pardons to six Iran-Contra 
conspirators28—all high officials, friends, and colleagues—sparing them 
shame and imprisonment, and sparing himself further investigation by the 
 
 23.  CROUCH, supra note 1, at 88-89; Crouch, supra note 18, 38 PRES. STUD. Q. at 725-26. 
 24.  CROUCH, supra note 1, at 89; Crouch, supra note 18, 38 PRES. STUD. Q. at 726; Love, 
supra note 10, at 1172-93. 
 25.  See CROUCH, supra note 1, at 2, 53-65 (analyzing impact of Watergate on subsequent 
pardons).  
 26.  See PRESIDENT GERALD R. FORD, REMARKS ON TAKING THE OATH OF OFFICE, 1974 
PUB. PAPERS 1-3 (Aug. 9, 1974), https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-taking-the-
oath-office; PRESIDENT GERALD R. FORD, PROCLAMATION 4311: GRANTING PARDON TO 
RICHARD NIXON, 1974 PUB. PAPERS 103-104 (Sept. 8, 1974), https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ 
documents/proclamation-4311-granting-pardon-richard-nixon.  The Nixon pardon is addressed in 
detail in CROUCH, supra note 1, at 66-85, 129-36. 
 27.  CROUCH, supra note 1, at 94-95, 128-29. 
 28.  GEORGE H. W. BUSH, PROCLAMATION 6518: GRANT OF EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY, 28 
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 2382 (Dec. 24, 1992), https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents 
/proclamation-6518-grant-executive-clemency.  For background on how these pardons came about 
and protected President Bush, see Noah Feldman, Senators, Ask William Barr About His Pardon 
Strategy, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 10, 2019, 4:30 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles 
/2019-01-10/attorney-general-william-barr-used-pardons-to-protect-president (detailing how then-
Attorney General Barr “gave Bush the cover he needed to issue the pardons”).  The Iran-Contra 
pardons are assessed in CROUCH, supra note 2, at 95, 101-07, 136-39. 
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Independent Counsel into what he knew and when he knew it.29  As with 
Ford, despite outrage in some quarters, Bush himself suffered no 
consequences beyond criticism in the press; when he died in 2018, there were 
only a few references to his shameful act of short-circuiting justice.30 
President Bill Clinton waited until his very last day in office in 2001 to short-
circuit the established process for granting pardons.  In that last-minute flurry, he 
issued more than 175 pardons, more than 60 of which had not been properly 
evaluated by the Justice Department’s Office of Pardons.31  Among the unvetted 
pardons were those issued to two close associates, his brother, and a Whitewater 
figure.  Most notoriously and sordidly, President Clinton also pardoned the 
fugitive arms dealer Marc Rich, former husband of Denise Rich, who was a close 
political supporter and an important donor to the Clinton Presidential Library.32  
 
 29.  According to his biographer, Bush acknowledged at the time in his personal diary that 
“the chief issue was the charge that he was letting [former Defense Secretary Caspar] Weinberger 
off the hook ‘in order to cover my own ass.’”  JON MEACHAM, DESTINY AND POWER: THE 
AMERICAN ODYSSEY OF GEORGE HERBERT WALKER BUSH 531 (2015). 
 30. Compare, e.g., Karen Tumulty, George H.W. Bush, 41st President of the United States, 
Dies at 94, WASH. POST (Nov. 30, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/obituaries/geo rg 
e-hw-bush-41st-president-of-the-united-states-dies-at-94/2018/12/01/8e85a9ba-de75-11e6-ad42-f 
3375f271c9c_gallery.html (no mention of the pardons in obituary) with Adam Nagourney, George 
Bush, Who Steered Nation in Tumultuous Times, Is Dead at 94, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 30, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/30/us/politics/george-hw-bush-dies.html (quoting Independent 
Counsel Lawrence E. Walsh in the aftermath of the 1992 pardons: “‘The Iran-contra cover-up, 
which has continued for more than six years, has now been completed.’”). 
 31.  U.S DEPT. OF JUSTICE, PARDONS GRANTED BY PRESIDENT WILLIAM J. CLINTON (1993-
2001), https://www.justice.gov/pardon/clinton-pardons#january202001.  See Albert W. Alschuler, 
Bill Clinton’s Parting Pardon Party, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1131, 1136 (2010). 
 32.  Albert W. Alschuler, supra note 31, at 1137-42.  CROUCH, supra note 1, at 108-11 
(Clinton previously pardoned members of the Puerto Rican terrorist organization “FALN” for 
reasons that were apparently based on electoral politics in New York State); Margaret Colgate 
Love, The Pardon Paradox: Lessons of Clinton’s Last Pardons, 31 CAP. U. L. REV. 185, 204 (2003) 
(A former Pardon Attorney noted that, because President Clinton “regarded the pardon power as a 
personal one, he felt unconstrained by the rules and procedures that had guided and protected his 
predecessors.  Apparently, no one on his own staff made any effort to dissuade him of this intensely 
narcissistic view of the pardon power throughout his two terms as President.”). 
(DO NOT DELETE) 10/7/2019  11:28 AM 
10 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 47:1 
A congressional committee subsequently investigated Clinton’s record on 
pardons, and issued a scathing report.33 
George W. Bush partly resisted persistent appeals—especially from 
Vice-President Richard Cheney—to pardon Cheney’s Chief of Staff, I. 
Lewis “Scooter” Libby.  Libby was convicted of obstruction of justice and 
perjury in connection with the White House’s vindictive outing of a deep-
cover CIA agent, Valerie Plame Wilson.34  Bush responded to the pressure 
by commuting Libby’s sentence.35  While Bush received some praise for 
allowing justice to be done to some extent, acute observers noted that 
commutation was also a self-protective act.  By using a commutation instead 
of a pardon, Bush was merciful in sparing Libby prison.  The commutation 
also enabled Libby to continue to invoke the Fifth Amendment in further 
inquiries, thus saving officials from revelation of their roles in the outing of 
CIA agent Valerie Plame.36  In other words, as with his father’s Iran-Contra 
pardons, the second President Bush granted mercy to an associate while 
protecting himself and other officials from further jeopardy.37 
Writing in 2010, Margaret Colgate Love, a former U.S. Pardon 
Attorney, observed: “Since 1980, however, presidential pardoning has fallen 
on hard times, its benign purposes frustrated by politicians’ fear of making a 
mistake, and subverted by unfairness in the way pardons are granted.”38  She 
contended that, “as the official route to clemency has all but closed, the 
 
 33.  COMM. ON GOV’T REFORM, JUSTICE UNDONE: CLEMENCY DECISIONS IN THE CLINTON 
WHITE HOUSE, H.R. REP. NO. 107-454, at 28-29 (2002) (“In his rush to grant pardons and 
commutations in the waning hours of his presidency, Clinton ignored almost every applicable 
standard governing the exercise of the clemency power.”).  See also CROUCH, supra note 1, at 111-
17, 140-42 (describing circumstances of and reaction to Clinton’s last-minute pardons).  On a 
lighter note, inspired and appalled by what President Clinton did in 2001, the television show, The 
West Wing, addressed the pardon power, and how it feels to be inside the White House making 
those decisions, in the episode The Benign Prerogative (NBC television broadcast Jan. 14, 2004), 
https://www.springfieldspringfield.co.uk/view_episode_scripts.php?tv-show=the-west-wing&epis 
ode=s05e11.  As one character scoffs, “Benign? It’s a bag of lit dynamite.”  The episode refers to 
low-profile offenders who are pardoned as “packing peanuts”; they are “useful insulation for any 
cronies I may wanna spring.”  Id. 
 34.  VALERIE PLAME WILSON, FAIR GAME: HOW A TOP CIA AGENT WAS BETRAYED BY HER 
OWN GOVERNMENT 295-96 (2007). 
 35.  GEORGE W. BUSH, PROCLAMATION 8159: GRANT OF EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY, 43 
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 902 (July 2, 2007), https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/ 
proclamation-8159-grant-executive-clemency.  See also CROUCH, supra note 1, at 117-26, 142-45 
(describing circumstances of and reaction to commutation for Libby). 
 36.  WILSON, supra note 34, at 388.  
 37.  President Trump exonerated Libby entirely in 2018.  DONALD J. TRUMP, EXECUTIVE 
GRANT OF CLEMENCY (Apr. 13, 2018),  https://www.justice.gov/pardon/page/file/1052911/down 
load.  See Peter Baker, Trump Pardons Scooter Libby in a Case That Mirrors His Own, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 13, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/13/us/politics/trump-pardon-scooter-libby.html. 
 38.  Love, supra note 10, 100 J. CRIM. L. AND CRIMINOLOGY at 1169 (2010).   
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back–door route has opened wide.”39  About Presidents Clinton and George 
W. Bush, she noted, “The two presidents are also at fault: in confirming 
popular beliefs about pardon’s irregularity and unfairness, they disserved 
both the institution of the presidency and their own legacies.”40 
Because the Administration of President Barack Obama left a 
demonstrably cleaner record, it is possible that Obama was not ever tempted 
to grant pardons with a personal agenda.  Even if he had been tempted, that 
allure does not appear to be reflected in his record of issuing over 1900 
commutations and pardons while in office.41 
Because abuse of the presidential pardon power since the 1970s does 
appear to be at variance with the preceding 180 years, Trump’s political and 
personal weaponizing of pardons should then be viewed as an intensification 
of a worrisome trend.  The days of presidential high character and self–
abnegation expressing themselves in respect for the original purposes of the 
presidential power of the pardon seem to have been left far behind. 
II.  Adjusting the Power to Pardon 
Once a malignant trend is in place, action to counter the trend is 
required.  If scholars correctly posit that Hamilton’s theory worked well for 
the first 180 years, but then broke down after Watergate, what are we to do? 
Soft measures could be taken.  Congress could pass legislation, such as 
H.R. 5551, which was proposed by Representative Adam Schiff, mandating 
that the United States Department of Justice provide information to Congress 
on certain questionable pardons.42  The bill would ensure that the facts 
surrounding the pardon would be revealed, even if the damage from the 
pardon itself could not be undone.  Others have suggested that presidents be 
required to give a reason for the pardon, again invoking the power of public 
exposure.43  Alternatively, Congress could pass a resolution reaffirming the 
original intent of the pardon to serve the purposes of “act of grace” and 
“public welfare” only, with the implied threat of impeachment as the 
sanction for violating those norms.  These soft measures might make 
presidents think twice before violating the original intent of the pardon 
 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  Id. at 1172.  
 41.  U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, CLEMENCY STATISTICS  OF BARACK OBAMA (AUG. 13, 2019), 
https://www.justice.gov/pardon/clemency-statistics#obama.  See Margaret Colgate Love, Obama’s 
Clemency Legacy: An Assessment, 29 FED. SENT. REP. 271 (2017).  
 42.  H.R. 5551, 115th Cong., 2d Sess. (2018). 
 43.  Kathleen Dean Moore, Pardon for Good and Sufficient Reasons, 27 U. RICH. L. REV. 
281, 281 (1993); Jeffrey P. Crouch, The President and the Pardon Power: A Bibliographic Essay, 
1989-2015, 27 U. ST. THOMAS L. REV. 413, 418-19 (2016).  
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power, and they would serve to buttress the claims that Congress is a 
watchful and coequal branch of government.44  None, however, would 
dissuade a determined executive of less than stellar character, or especially 
a lame duck president making midnight pardons on the eve of departure, 
from acting for personal or political benefit.45 
At the other end of the spectrum, the strongest measure of all would be 
to pass a constitutional amendment simply revoking the power to pardon.  
We view this as an unduly severe reaction to a generally valuable power that 
is only sometimes abused.  Surely, Hamilton’s judgment still holds that the 
pardon power is an important safety valve for mercy in the judicial process, 
and that national purposes can be furthered by judicious use of the power.46 
What intermediate measures might then be available to readjust the 
power to avoid misuse?  Some have suggested that certain types of pardons 
be forbidden—pardoning one’s self, family members, or close associates, or 
issuing a pardon preemptively, for instance.47  Another suggestion has been 
to place a moratorium on pardons from October 1 of any presidential election 
year until after the next inauguration in January.48  The trouble with singling 
out specifically incorrect practices, however, is that there are too many 
variables for them to be well-captured in a constitutional text.49  There will 
always be other practices that are objectionable, and if they were not 
specifically named, the interpretative doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio 
alterius would suggest that they were allowed.50 
We think that the most effective approach to curbing abuses would be 
to adjust the procedure by which pardons are issued.  Hamilton’s logic in 
The Federalist Papers explained why the Framers lodged the pardon power 
 
 44.  For more suggestions for reform, see CROUCH, supra note 1, at 146-149; KATHLEEN 
DEAN MOORE, PARDONS: JUSTICE, MERCY, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 211-24 (1989).  
 45.  See Gregory C. Sisk, Suspending the Pardon Power During the Twilight of A Presidential 
Term, 67 MO. L. REV. 13, 27 (2002).  
 46.  See MOORE, supra note 43, at 225 (rejecting the argument that the pardon system should 
be abolished someday because, “[m]uch of the progress in the legal system has been prompted by 
pardons”).  
 47.  Id. at 199-210 (addressing “improper uses of the pardon power”).  Ignoring one or more 
of the Justice Department guidelines for clemency are other examples.  COMM. ON GOV’T REFORM, 
supra note 33, at 29-30 (detailing standards).  
 48.  Sisk, supra note 45, 67 MO. L. REV. at 26-27 (addressing why “[t]he door to executive 
clemency should close before the votes of the electorate are cast in a presidential election and 
reopen only on inauguration day”). 
 49.  See Kobil, supra note 11, at 592 (quoting James Iredell arguing for the President’s pardon 
power at a state ratifying convention in 1788: “It is impossible for any general law to foresee and 
provide for all possible cases that may arise.”). 
 50.  “Expression of one thing is the exclusion of another.”  Expressio unius est exclusio 
alterius, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
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in a single individual.  In practice, the federal bureaucracy has regularized 
and broadened that individual procedure.  There is an Office of the Pardon 
Attorney within the Department of Justice with well-established deliberative 
procedures for reviewing pardons, and criteria for recommending worthy 
candidates for pardons to the President.51  For the great majority of pardons 
in modern times, this is the procedure that has been followed.  Since this 
procedure is normative rather than established by law, however, presidents 
have been able to evade it in precisely those cases that go beyond grace and 
national purpose. 
One approach to reform would be to mandate that these procedures 
should be followed without exception.  A similar proposal would be to create 
a Presidential Clemency Board to review and approve all presidential 
pardons.52  Another proposal would be to designate the Vice President as the 
head of a White House Clemency Office.53  The problems with such 
approaches are: the cumbersomeness of the arrangements, the likelihood that 
the participants would not be sufficiently independent of the President, and 
the difficulty of opposing presidential will when the gulf between the 
prestige of a President and a functionary is so wide. 
The basic idea of a second independent assent to a President’s desire to 
issue a pardon, however, is tenable.  We propose that this second entity 
needing to co-sign the pardon document not be a committee, nor a 
bureaucratic entity, nor a person appointed by the President, nor someone 
whose prestige pales in comparison to the President.  We propose that the 
needed co–signature come from the highest constitutional officer elected 
independently from the President, who also happens to represent the coequal 
branch of government, Congress.  That officer, next in the line of succession 
for the Presidency after the Vice President by statute, is the Speaker of the 
House of Representatives.54 
How would this have worked in cases of questionable use of the pardon 
power?  Certainly, knowing that the Speaker’s signature was required, the 
 
 51.  See U.S DEPT. OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF PARDON ATTORNEY, https://www.justice 
.gov/pardon. 
 52.  Kobil, supra note 11, at 622-24. 
 53.  Paul J. Larkin, Jr., A Proposal To Restructure the Clemency Process—The Vice President 
as Head of a White House Clemency Office, 40 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 237 (2017).  
 54.  3 U.S.C. § 19(a)(1) (2012).  Under the Constitution, the House of Representative “shall 
chuse their Speaker.”  U.S. CONST.  art. I, § 2, cl. 5.  As such, the Speaker is more independent 
from the President than is the Vice President, who ran for office on the same ticket.  U.S. CONST. 
amend. XII (1804).  The theoretical issue of the validity of the order of succession mandated by 
Congress would not apply to this proposal.  Implementation would take a constitutional 
amendment, obviating any questions.  See BRIAN C. KALT, supra note 2, at 83-105 (“The Line of 
Succession Controversy”). 
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President and his advisors would have reviewed the pardons more 
thoroughly and widely.  Would Speaker Carl Albert have co-signed for the 
1974 pardon of Richard Nixon,55 Tom Foley for Iran-Contra in 1992,56 
Dennis Hastert for Marc Rich in 2001,57 Paul Ryan for Joe Arpaio in 2017,58 
or Nancy Pelosi for Conrad Black and what may come?59  While those 
counter-factuals are unknowable, it seems that the additional layer of 
approval would be protective, at least in the most controversial cases.  When 
the President and the Speaker are members of the same party, the co-
signature requirement may not be a strong check on presidential power.  
However, even in such a scenario, perspectives, interests, and characters 
differ.  While the second signature requirement would not be foolproof, it 
will likely screen out many of the questionable pardons. 
III.  Objections and Unanticipated Consequences 
We recognize that the controversial pardons are but a small percentage 
of all pardons issued by presidents.  Therefore, arguably, the matter is not 
important enough to expend the effort to secure ratification of a 
constitutional amendment.  Our response is that, while the number has been 
small, these are very important and visible pardons because they undermine 
the ideals of equal justice under law, and that no one is above the law.  
Democracies require that their citizenry regard government as legitimate and 
worthy of receiving the consent of the governed.  Such very visible cases of 
misuse of power cast a long shadow on that legitimacy. 
Our suggested remedy might suffer from a defect foreseen by 
Hamilton—the President could become less personally involved and caring.  
With another official’s signature required, judgments of mercy could be 
subject to political trading of favors.  Instead of elevating the power to 
pardon, involving another politician in the process might degrade it.  Just as 
the odds of one of two elected officials being of high moral character are 
greater than of one, so are the odds of one of two being of low moral 
character similarly increased.  Indeed, whereas Hamilton hoped the President 
would possess high moral character, adding another requirement might bring 
out the worst rather than the best in character, and the pardon might be just 
 
 55.  U.S HOUSE OF REP., HISTORY, ART & ARCHIVES: LIST OF SPEAKERS OF THE HOUSE, 
history.house.gov/People/Office/Speakers-List/ (Albert was Speaker from 1971 to 1977.). 
 56.  Id.  (Foley was Speaker from 1989 to 1995.). 
 57.  Id.  (Hastert was Speaker from 1999 to 2007.). 
 58.  Id.  (Ryan was Speaker from 2015 to 2019.). 
 59.  Id.  (Pelosi resumed serving as Speaker in 2019.). 
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another jewel to be stolen by manipulation and connections.60  Change never 
guarantees improvement, and institutional processes can only do so much to 
alleviate the weight of poor character and a culture of lawless self-interest.  
Still, even though our era has cast doubt on the ability of politicians to 
cooperate in a noble cause of governing, we believe that requiring a second 
signature from a high elected official will increase the odds that nobility in 
the use of the pardon would return and remain. 
Another objection to the proposal might be that eliminating the absolute 
discretion to pardon from presidential power would weaken the executive 
office.  Having a tool with which to fight back might appear necessary to an 
embattled president.61  Indeed, that is the declared strategy of President 
Trump, who often proclaims that he is a “counter–puncher.”62  In modern 
times, however, and in ways certainly not envisioned by the Founders, we 
have seen substantial political power shift away from Congress to, what the 
historian Arthur Schlesinger once termed, “The Imperial Presidency.”63  
Nowadays, we are concerned not that Congress is too powerful, but that it is 
not powerful enough.64  It should also be noted that that few states grant their 
governors the unfettered power that presidents now enjoy.65  They often 
require a second person or body to agree with governors’ recommendations 
for pardons.66  Being able to check a nefarious purpose of pardoning might 
be one way the People could help the Congress reassert the balance of power 
our Founders created. 
Finally, although we typically think of unanticipated consequences as 
being unwelcome, unforeseen positive effects are also possible.  For 
instance, some observers believe that granting pardons for merciful purposes 
 
 60.  See THE FEDERALIST NO. 74, supra note 12, at 423 (“the secret sympathy of friends and 
favorers of the condemned . . . might frequently bestow impunity, where the terror of an example 
was necessary.”).  See also JONATHAN T. DORRIS, supra note 22, 135-52 (addressing pardon 
seekers and brokers in the Andrew Johnson Administration). 
 61.  See CROUCH, supra note 1, at 147 (“[p]residential sympathizers” argue that presidents 
“use the powers of their office to strike back” when attacked). 
 62.  E.g., Marisa Schultz & Nikki Schwab, Trump Threatens to Declassify ‘Devastating’ 
Documents About Democrats, N.Y. POST (Nov. 28, 2018), https://nypost.com/2018/11/28/trump-
threatens-to-declassify-devastating-docs-about-democrats/.  
 63.  ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY (2004). 
 64.  The President’s veto of Congress’ attempt to override his over-reach of emergency 
powers to secure money to pay for a border wall is a recent example.  Emily Cochrane, House Fails 
to Override Trump’s Veto, Preserving National Emergency Order, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 29, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/26/us/politics/national-emergency-vote.html. 
 65.  See Eckstein & Colby, supra note 16, 51 ARIZ. ST. L.J. at 104-05 (surveying methods 18 
states use to curb unfettered gubernatorial power to pardon). 
 66.  E.g., NEB. CONST. art. IV, § 13 (governor, secretary of state, and attorney general 
constitute the board of pardon); PA. CONST. art. IV, § 9(a) (governor issues pardons, but may not 
act without an affirmative recommendation from pardon board chaired by the lieutenant governor). 
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have been inhibited because of increased surveillance and suspicion.67  Two 
signatures might inoculate both signatories from some criticism.  In addition, 
the need to work together on pardons might open up additional avenues for 
executive-legislative cooperation. 
IV.  Practicality 
It is very difficult to pass a constitutional amendment.  Two–thirds of 
each house of Congress and three–quarters of the States must consent to an 
amendment.68  However, some amendments do get passed. 
There appear to be two types of successfully adopted amendments: 
major amendments and minor amendments.  Major amendments have been 
successfully adopted after profound changes in society, as after the Civil 
War,69 or after great movements changed opinions, as with women’s 
suffrage.70  Minor amendments have passed because they have not offended 
any significant entrenched interests.  The right to vote at the age of 
eighteen,71 the limitation of presidents to two terms,72 and the limitations on 
Congress giving itself raises73 are good examples.  Since our proposed 
amendment would have prospective effect only, state and federal legislators 
would consider circumscribing the power of unknown future presidents, not 
the current occupant of the office.  Thus, we think that our proposed 
amendment would fall into the latter category, where no significant interests 
would be offended. 
The second requirement for passage is that there be sufficient support 
for the large effort required.  There needs to be intensity.  In normal times, 
there would not be the intensity of public support required to reform the 
power of the presidential pardon.74  As we are constantly reminded, however, 
these are not normal times.  Imagine the outrage that will emerge should 
Trump fulfill his threats to bestow pardons on those who do not cooperate 
with legitimate congressional inquiries, if he pardons his family members, 
his cabinet members, or himself.  It would be difficult to imagine that 
 
 67.  Love, supra note 10, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY at 1204 (“Recent presidents 
allowed the power to fall into disuse apparently because they saw nothing to be gained by pardoning 
that was not outweighed by the possibility of making a politically damaging mistake.”). 
 68.  U.S. CONST. art. V. 
 69.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIII (1865); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (1868); U.S. CONST. amend. 
XV (1870). 
 70.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIX (1920). 
 71.  U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI (1971). 
 72.  U.S. CONST. amend. XXII (1951). 
 73.  U.S. CONST. amend. XXVII (1992). 
 74.  See BRIAN C. KALT, supra note 2, at 60 (“Realistically, only a real scandal could motivate 
constitutional change [of the pardon power]”).  
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insufficient demand to enact meaningful reforms of the pardoning power, 
including a constitutional amendment.  The power of public outrage should 
never be underestimated. 
V.  Conclusion 
The presidential pardon has been increasingly abused since 
Watergate.  To maintain an effective democracy, equality before the law is 
fundamental.  Constant vigilance and readjustment are necessary to 
maintain fairness in society.  Preserving the pardon power is important for 
mercy in justice and for strategic national purposes.  The soft measures of 
revealing all evidence for what has been pardoned, and openly declaring 
Congress’ sense that we should return to the original intent of pardons, 
might help, and could serve as useful first steps.  However, we suggest that 
a stronger measure, making a procedural adjustment to the pardon process, 
might soon be seen as necessary. 
Americans rightly view the Constitution as a sacred document,75 but 
not a perfect one conceived immaculately; we know that difficult practical 
decisions and compromise were part of the process.  The Founders 
demonstrated that they knew it was imperfect when they included a means 
of amending the document.76  Hamilton’s reliance on the high character of 
the presidents, and their respect for the office, appear to have been fairly 
well–placed for nearly two centuries.  In light of the past 40 years plus of 
experience, however, we the People need to reconsider the views of the 
Anti–Federalists, and grant a portion of the responsibility for the pardon 
power to the Speaker of the House of Representatives. 
The “benign prerogative of pardoning”77 is a huge responsibility; it 
should not be misused by the person in whom we have placed our trust.  
Adopting procedures to prevent the weaponization of the presidential 
power of the pardon for personal and political purposes is only prudent.  
We believe that our proposed constitutional amendment would do just that.  
 
 75.  Neil S. Siegel, The Virtue of Judicial Statesmanship, 86 TEX. L. REV. 959, 984 (2008) 
quoting Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, The Idea of a Constitution, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 167, 169 (1987) 
(“Because the Constitution functions in part as the repository of our ‘fundamental nature as a 
people’—because it gives voice to the deepest values of the nation—‘there is a sense, after all, in 
which our constitution is sacred and demands our respectful acknowledgement.’”). 
 76.  U.S. CONST. art. V.  See THE FEDERALIST NO. 49 at 245-46 (James Madison) (addressing 
both the need for a “constitutional road” for the people to act “for certain great and extraordinary 
occasions,” but not doing so too often, which would “deprive the government of that veneration 
which time bestows”).  
 77.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 74, supra note 12, at 362 (Alexander Hamilton) (Terence Ball ed., 
2003). 
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We hope it will be taken into consideration as the next inevitable wave of 
reform arises. 
 
